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Jay C. ~arlisle*

During the 2000-2001 survey year, federal courts in the Second
Circuit published approximately fifty personal jurisdiction opinions.
The majority of the opinions handed down in federal district courts dealt
with diversity matters and involved the application of New York State's
long-arm statute.' There were, however, several significant circuit court
opinions.2 One involved the district court's premature personal
jurisdiction dismissal of a matter without consideration of whether the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") applied.3 Another
involved a human rights claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the
question of whether foreign companies were doing business in New
York based on their maintenance of an Investors Relations Office in
New York
A third set forth important guidelines for a district
court's rejection of a personal jurisdictional challenge,5 while another
reminded the bench and bar that circuit court review of district court
dismissals for want of personal jurisdiction are de n o ~ o . ~
The district and circuit court opinions demonstrate that the bench
*

Professor of Law, Pace University Law School; Editor, Second Circuit Digest,
1990-1994.
1. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001). C.P.L.R. 302 is New York's longarm statute. It allows New York State courts to assert jurisdiction over non-domiciliary
individuals and foreign corporations incapable of being served within the state, but
having the contacts with the state that are listed in section 302. Such a defendant may
be served outside the state as provided by C.P.L.R. 313. The personal jurisdiction
obtained is limited by the terms of C.P.L.R. 302, as well as by constitutional
considerations. C.P.L.R. 302 is a "restricted" long-arm statute, such that it does not go
as far as is constitutionally permissible.
2. See infra Part LI.
3. Reiss v. Societe Centrale Du Groupe Des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d
738, 747-48 (2d Cir. 2000).
4. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1402 (2001).
5. Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2000),
vacated by 139 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
6. King v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. 00-7320, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
981, at *5 (2d Cir. Jan. 23,2001).
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and bar of the Second Circuit devote an enormous amount of time to
resolving jurisdictional disputes.7 They also indicate a lack of
uniformity in applying concepts of personal juri~diction.~Finally, they
suggest that judges in the circuit are willing to apply New York7slongarm statuteg to matters involving "jurisdictional contacts" based on
telephones, fax machines, and web-sites.''
This Survey Article will review some of the district and circuit
courts' significant decisions, and comment on future trends for
application of the law of personal jurisdiction in the Second Circuit.
The Article concludes with a recommendation that district court judges
should not grant or deny personal jurisdiction defenses until at least
limited jurisdictional discovery has been granted and is completed."

Whether a federal court in the Second Circuit has personal
jurisdiction over a given defendant in a diversity case, or in matters
where there is no nationwide jurisdiction, is determined according to the
law of the forum state.12 This involves a two-step inquiry. First, the
court must consider the forum state's jurisdictional statutes, and,
second, the court must consider and apply federal due process
standards.13 These standards have been summarized by the Second

7. See infra Parts 11, 111.
8. See infra Part 111.
9. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001).
10. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing
for lack of personal jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant
committed a tortious act in New York, as required under the New York long-arm
statute); A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that
breach of contract for failure to perform financial services in New York was sufficient to
subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute);
Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that
personal jurisdiction is "determined by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which
the court sits"); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963)
(holding that in diversity actions, jurisdiction is governedby the law of the state in
which the court sits). See also King v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. 00-7320, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 981, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that federal courts must
apply the personal jurisdiction laws of the forum state); Fort Knox Music, Inc. v.
Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated by 139 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (stating that federal courts must apply the personal jurisdiction rules of the forum
state).
13. See cases cited supra note 12.
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Circuit in Chew v. ~ i e t r i c h . ' ~
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant with whom it has
"certain minimum contacts. . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'. . . In
determining whether minimum contacts exist, the court considers "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum [state], and the litigation." . . .

To establish the minimum contacts necessary to justify "specific" jurisdiction,
[the plaintiff] first must show that [its] claim arises out of or relates to [the
defendant's] contacts with [the forum state]. [The plaintiff] must also show
that [the defendant] "purposefully availed [itself] of the privilege of doing
business in [the forum state and that [the defendant] could foresee being
13
"hailed into court" there. . . .

The issue of personal jurisdiction must be determined separately
for each cause of action asserted in the plaintiff's complaint.16 Also,
Second Circuit Federal District Courts have considerable discretion in
deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."
A court may determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone, it
may permit discovery in aid of the motion, or it may conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the motion.'' If the court does not conduct a full
hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction; however, he must ultimately establish jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial hearing or at trial.19 In
making the prima facie determination, the Second Circuit has held that
courts should consider the pleadings and affidavits in the light most
14. 143 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998).
15. Id.at28.
IN NEW YORK§§ 9-4 to 9-23 (Phillip M.
16. See CIVILPRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Halpern & Jay C. Carlisle et al. eds., West Group 2000).
17. See infra notes 18-2 1 and accompanying text.
18. See Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 1999)
(permitting extensive discovery into defendants' contacts with forum state); Bank
Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that a prima facie showing of jurisdiction can be satisfied with allegations in
plaintiffs affidavits and supporting materials). Moreover, a court may consider matters
outside the pleadings without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. See Bank Brussels Lambert, 171 F.3d at 784.
19. Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1990).
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favorable to the plaintiff.20 If no discovery has been conducted, the
truth of the plaintiffs allegations will be assumed for purposes of the
jurisdiction inquiry.2'
Most Second Circuit 2000-2001 diversity in personam jurisdiction
cases involve application of New York State law under principles of
specific jurisdiction, pursuant to the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules 302 ("c.P.L.R.").~~ Several cases involve issues of general
jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. 301.23 The important practical
distinction between these two concepts is that, with the former, only the
plaintiff's cause of action must arise from New York related a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~
The question of whether there was proper notice of the commencement
of the action is not discussed in this Survey.

A. General Jurisdiction: C.P. L.R. 301
The traditional basis for the exercise of jurisdiction that developed
prior to the adoption of the C.P.L.R. was incorporated by C.P.L.R.
3 0 1 . ~ ~Thus, personal jurisdiction based on physical presence,26
20. See Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 148 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating
that a jurisdiction testing motion may be defeated by good faith allegations of
jurisdiction). See also Ball, 902 F.2d at 197 (stating that "[alt [the] preliminary stage,
the plaintiffs prima facie showing may be established solely by allegations[,]" however,
"[alfter discovery, the plaintiffs prima facie showing . . . must include an averment of
facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the
defendant.").
21. Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1052 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Photoactive Prods., Inc. v. Al-Or Int'l, Ltd., 99 F. Supp.' 2d 281, 28788 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The terms "general" and "specific" personal jurisdiction were
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Heliocopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.2 (1984). See also Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 42
L. REV.343, 364-367 (1991) (describing reach of long-arm jurisdictiori under
SYRACUSE
L.
C.P.L.R. 302) [hereinafter Carlislel]; Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 39 SYRACUSE
REV. 75, 98-100 (1988) (discussing the basis for general jurisdiction under C.P.L.R.
301) [hereinafter Carlisle21.
23. See Domond v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 368, 373
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting claim of general jurisdiction over defendant under a "doing
business" theory); Ugalde v. DynaCorp, Inc., No. 98-Civ-5459, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1745, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2000) (explaining that plaintiff established a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction over defendant under a "doing business" theory).
24. Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 130 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Talbot
v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1028-29 (N.Y. 1988) (discussing the
"arising out o f ' and "articuable nexus" requirements).
25. See Carlislel, supra note 22, at 361-63.
26. There are two exceptions to the presence requirement. First, a person is not
deemed present in New York for purposes of service of process if he or she is induced to
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domicile:' consent:8 or "doing business"29permits New York courts to
assert jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of action irrespective
of whether it arises from the defendant's contacts with New ~ o r k . ~ '
The "doing business" concept is frequently used to obtain jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation. Although the New York Court of Appeals
has stated that "the test for 'doing business' is and should be a simple
and pragmatic one,"31 a review of the cases decided during the survey
year indicates that the test, while pragmatic, is far from simple.

B. Specific Jurisdiction: C.P.L.R. 302
C.P.L.R. 302 permits New York courts to assert jurisdiction over
non-domiciliary individuals and foreign corporations that are not subject
to C.P.L.R. 301, but instead have the state contacts listed in C.P.L.R.
3 0 2 . ~This
~ long-arm statute is limited by the terms of C.P.L.R. 302, as
well as by federal and state constitutional considerations, to claims that
enter by fraud. Secondly, he or she is immune from process if he or she appeared
voluntarily, as a plaintiff or defendant, to attend proceedings involving criminal or civil
litigation. This immunity exception is not applicable if a person would be subject to
long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302. Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125, 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
27. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313 (McKinney 2001) (stating that a New York domiciliary
is subject to in personam jurisdiction on any claim, wherever it arises, and regardless of
where the defendant is located at the time the summons is served).
28. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301 (McKinney 2001). In Dan-Dee International, Ltd. v.
Kmart Corp., No. 99-Civ-11689, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13411, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
18, 2000), the court stated that a corporation "may be subjected to suit in New York
under C.P.L.R. 301(a) only if the corporation has engaged in such a continuous and
systematic course of 'doing business' . . . as to warrant a finding of its 'presence' in the
jurisdiction."
29. See Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985)
(describing the "doing business" requirement as not occasionally or casually but with a
degree of permanence); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439, 440 (N.Y.
1965) (stating that maintaining an office in New York City indicates that the defendant
is "doing business" in the state sufficient to subject him or her to jurisdiction). See
generally Vincent Alexander, 'Doing Business' Jurisdiction: Some Unresolved Issues,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 19, 2001, at 3 (stating that "doing business" jurisdiction is well settled as
a method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over an unlicensed foreign corporation).
30. See Weissman v. Seiyu, Ltd., No. 98-Civ-6976,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 509, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2000) (stating that "[a] cause of action arises out of a defendant's
New York transaction when it is sufficiently related to the business transacted such that
it would not be unfair to deem it to arise out of the transacted business"); Laufer v.
Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692,694 (N.Y. 1982) (finding sufficient contacts within New York
to be "considered systematic, regular[,] and continuous").
31. Bryant, 208 N.E.2d at 441.
32. CIVILPRETRIAL
PROCEEDINGS
IN NEWYORK,supra note 16, at 9.5.
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arise from the defendant's activity related to New ~ o r k .C.P.L.R.
~ ~
302(a)(l), covering tort, contract, and commercial matters, and C.P.L.R.
302(a)(3)(ii), covering tort and commercial tort matters, were frequently
analyzed by circuit court judges during the survey year.34 Other
segments of the long-arm statute were seldom disc~ssed.~'

II. SECOND
CIRCUITCOURTCASES
There were several significant Second Circuit personal jurisdiction
cases published during the survey year. One unpublished decision was
rendered. The first case is Reiss v. Societe Centrale Du Groupe Des
Assurances ~ a t i o n a l e s where
, ~ ~ the Second Circuit held that the trial
court erred in deciding whether there was personal jurisdiction when it
should have decided if the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applied.
The second case is Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,37 where the
Second Circuit found general jurisdiction, under C.P.L.R. 301, over a
defendant who was doing business in New York through an Investors
Relations Office. The third case is Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. ~ a ~ t i s t e , ~ ~
where the Second Circuit held that the district court's failure to give a
reason for rejecting defendant's challenge to personal jurisdiction
precluded an appellate review on other issues raised. Finally, the
unpublished opinion reminded the bar that circuit court review of
personal jurisdiction issues are de n ~ v o . ~ ~
A. The Reiss Case

In Reiss, the plaintiff-appellant appealed from a judgment entered
against him in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York by Judge Shira ~cheindlin.~'The judge dismissed his
action to recover a finder's fee against defendants-appellees. The
dismissal was based on a lack of personal jurisdiction, as well as for a
failure to state a claim. The district court considered these objections
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text.
35. No more than five cases per survey year discuss the "contracts anywhere"
clause of C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1).
36. 235 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
37. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S . Ct. 1402 (2001).
38. 203 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated by 139 F . Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y.2001).
39. King.v. Washington Adventist Hosp., No. 00-7320, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
981, at *I (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2001).
40. Reiss, 235 F.3d at 745.
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before the completion of discovery and failed to recognize implications
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities ~ c t . ~ ' The court's
jurisdictional analysis was based on C.P.L.R. 301 and C.P.L.R. 302.
The court rejected the section 301 argument for personal jurisdiction
through subsidiary activities for failure to allege "facts suggesting that
the subsidiaries licensed in New York are agents or departments of any
of the defendant^.'^^ Also, the court rejected the section 302 argument
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to prove
that certain defendants had engaged in any activities that clothed them
with the apparent authority to make a finder's fee agreement with the
plaintiff.43
The circuit court, speaking through Judge Roger Miner, first
examined the question of whether the court had appellate jurisdiction
over the appeal. Judge Miner noted, "Although neither briefed nor
brought to our attention by the parties, the question arises from the fact
that no final judgment ever was entered in this case."44 Judge Miner
reasoned that the plaintiff-appellant meant to appeal from a final
judgment on the date an opinion and order were entered, even though no
formal judgment was entered. He then turned to the issue of in
personam jurisdiction and found error in the analysis undertaken by the
district court. He stated:
The initial question to be answered in this case is not whether there is personal
jurisdiction within the meaning of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules, but whether there is subject matter jurisdiction within the meaning of
45
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities . . . .

Judge Miner reasoned that, constrained by constitutional due
process considerations, personal jurisdiction under the FSIA equals
subject matter jurisdiction plus valid service of process. He noted that
the district court had failed to address the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction and that the parties had failed to include the actual moving
papers thereto in the appendix. Judge Miner, in a thoughtful analysis of
the FSIA, concluded that the district court's premature jurisdictional
4 1. Id. at 746.
42. Id. at 744 (quoting Reiss v. GAN, S.A., 78 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id.
44. Reiss, 235 F.3d at 745.
45. Id. at 746. Judge Miner reasoned, "[Slubject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA, an issue apparently presented to the district court but not addressed by it, must be
the object of our inquiry here." Id.
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dismissal prevented the parties from presenting evidentiary material at a
hearing on the question of FSIA jurisdiction. Judge Miner instructed
the district court to afford broad latitude to both sides in this regard and
to resolve the disputed factual matters by issuing findings of fact.46
The Second Circuit's decision in the Reiss case was issued on
December 27,2000. It reminds the bar once again of the "hazards of an
incomplete appendix."47 It also reminds federal district court judges
that there are different burdens and standards to apply with respect to
personal jurisdiction defenses made before and after discovery is
completed. In fact, what may appear to be an issue of personal
jurisdiction may involve issues of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. The Wiwa Case
In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum C O . ; ~two foreign holding
companies were sued by Nigerian CrnigrCs under the Alien Tort Claims
Act ("ATCA"), alleging human right violations. The companies moved
to dismiss. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, by Judge Kimba Wood, found that there was personal
jurisdiction, but dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds.
The Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Pierre Leval, held that
there was general jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 301, therefore, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens did not apply.
The plaintiffs' complaint alleging that they and their next of kin
were imprisoned, tortured, and killed by the Nigerian government, in
violation of the law of nations, at the instigation of the defendants, in
reprisal for their political opposition to the defendants' oil exploration
activities. The complaint alleged that the Shell Nigeria Company had
coercively appropriated land for oil development without adequate
compensation, and caused substantial pollution of the air and water in
46. Id. at 747. Judge Miner stated:
We think it is essential for the district court to afford the parties the opportunity to
present evidentiary material at a hearing on the question of FSIA jurisdiction. The
district court should afford broad latitude to both sides in this regard and resolve
disputed factual matters by issuing findings of fact.
Reiss, 235 F.3d at 747.
47. Id. at 746 (citing Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 407 (3d
Cir. 1980)). Judge Miner reminded the bar that "[tlhe parties seem to agree in their
briefs that the issue was presented but the absence of the actual moving papers in the
appendix impels us to warn the bar once again of the hazards of an incomplete
appendix." Id.
48. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1402 (2001).
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the homeland of the plaintiffs.
Defendants' only contacts with New York were their New York
Stock Exchange listings and their maintenance of an Investor Relations
Office in New York
On appeal, the defendants made four
arguments: ( I ) these activities were not attributable to the defendants for
jurisdictional purposes; (2) these New York activities cannot be
considered in the jurisdictional calculus because they were merely
incidental to a stock market listing, and were jurisdictionally
inconsequential as a matter of law; (3) the investor relations activities
were legally insufficient to confer general jurisdiction; and (4)
exercising jurisdiction over the defendants would violate the fairness
requirement of the Due Process Clause. The circuit court rejected each
of these contentions and held that the defendants were subject to
personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York.
Judge Leval reviewed the requirements for general jurisdiction in
the Second Circuit under C.P.L.R. 301. He explained that "doing
business" concepts in New York State permit a court to assert
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when it affiliates itself with a
New York representative entity. Further, New York representatives
render services on behalf of the foreign corporation that go beyond mere
solicitation, and are sufficiently important to the foreign entity, in that
the corporation itself would perform equivalent services if no agent
were available. He then stated, "Both Magistrate Judge Pitman and
Judge Wood found that Graspi and the Investor Relations Office were
agents of the defendants for jurisdictional purposes. We agreev5'
Judge Leval rejected the defendants' arguments that there was not an
agency relationship. He reasoned that the Investor Relations Office,
while not directly involved with the core functions of the defendants'
business, was of "meaningful importance to the defendant^."^' Thus, he
49.

Id. at 93. Judge Leval stated:
While nominally a part of Shell Oil, Grapsi and the Investor Relations Office
devoted one hundred percent of their time to the defendants' business. Their sole
business function was to perform investor relations services on the defendants'
behalf. The defendants fully funded the expenses of the Investor Relations Office
(including salary, rent, electricity, mailing costs, etc.), and Grapsi sought the
defendants' approval on important decisions.
Id. at 95-96.
50. Id. at 95.
51. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 96. Judge Leval's "meaningful importance to the
defendants" test significantly expands the Frummer/Gelfand test.
Judge Leval
implicitly accepted the defendants' argument that the Investors Relations Office was not
essential for operation of the defendants' business in New York, but found the office

H e i n o n l i n e - - 2 1 QLR 23 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 3

placed less emphasis on the Frummer/Gelfand "but for test,"52focusing
on a pragmatic "facilitation" test which stressed the volume and value of
the defendants' New York contacts in terms of constitutional
considerations of due process-forseeability and fairness.
Judge Leval also relied on New York's traditional set of indicia for
assertion of general jurisdiction under the C.P.L.R. His examples
included
whether the company has an office in the state, whether it has any bank
accounts or other property in the state, whether it has a phone listing in the
state, whether it does public relations work there, and whether it has
53
individuals permanently located in the state to promote its interests.

He also noted that "[tlhe Investor Relations Office, whose
activities are attributable to the defendants under the Frummer analysis,
meets each of these tests. It constitutes a substantial 'physical corporate
presence' in the [sltate, permanently dedicated to promoting the
defendants' interest^."^^
Finally, Judge Leval rejected the defendants' argument that it
would violate the fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause for a
New York court to exercise jurisdiction over them. Citing Keman v.
Kurz-Hustings, ~nc.?' he set forth a two-part test for asserting personal
jurisdiction: "the [sltate's laws authorize service of process upon the
defendant and an assertion of jurisdiction under the circumstances of the
case comports with the requirements of due process."56 Judge Leval
stated:
The required due process inquiry itself has two parts: whether a defendant has
"minimum contacts" with the forum state and whether the assertion of
jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice-that is whether. . . [the exercise of jurisdiction] is reasonable under
57
the circumstances of a particular case.

important to the maintenance of good relationships with existing investors and potential
investors. The defendants also argued that if they were to perform the investor relations
services themselves, it would not necessarily be in New York. Judge Leval rejected this
argument as extremely weak. Id.
52. Id. at 98.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 98 (citations omitted).
55. 175 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1999).
56. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 99.
57. Id. (quoting Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1027 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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Judge Leval explained that "once a plaintiff has made a 'threshold
showing' of minimum contacts, the defendant must come forward with
a 'compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would
render jurisdiction unreasonable. "'" Judge Leva1 admitted that there
were certain factors favoring jurisdictional dismissal but reasoned that
"[tlhe defendants control a vast, wealthy, and far-flung business empire
which operates in most parts of the globe."59 He stated:
[The defendants] have a physical presence in the forum state, have access to
enormous resources, face little or no language barrier, have litigated in this
country on previous occasions, have a four-decade long relationship with one
of the nation's leading law firms, and are the parent companies of one of
American's largest corporations, which has a very significant presence in New
York. New York City, furthermore, where the trial would be held, is a major
world capital which offers central location, easy access, and extensive
facilities of all kinds.60

For similar reasons, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Wood's
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, holding that the case
should be heard in the Southern District of New ~ o r k . ~The
' Second
Circuit's decision in Wiwa would please Justice Brennan and others
who advocate a flexible and pragmatic approach in the application of
personal jurisdiction principles.

-

58. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560
(2d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.
60. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 99. Judge Leval pointed out that the grant or denial of a
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is generally committed to the district
court's discretion. The deference accorded to the district court presupposes, however,
that the court used "the correct standards prescribed by the governing rule of law." Id.
(citing Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Judge Leval stated:
We believe that, as a matter of law, in balancing the competing interests, the
district court did not accord proper significance to a choice of forum by lawful
[United States] resident plaintiffs or to the policy interest implicit in our federal
statutory law in providing a forum for adjudication of claims of violations of the
law of nations.
Id.
61. Id.at108.
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C. The Fort Knox Music, Inc. Case

In Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. ~ a ~ t i s t ecopyright
,6~
holders brought
an action for a declaratory judgment under the Copyright Act over
ownership of the well-known song, the "Sea of Love." They sought a
declaration that a songwriter was time-barred from commencing any
action against them challenging their rights and copyright in a musical
composition. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, in a decision by Judge John E. Sprizzo, granted a
judgment on the pleadings for the plaintiffs, but denied their request for
attorneys' fees. The defendant had moved to dismiss the complaint
based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Sprizzo held a hearing
on the defendant's motion to dismiss, allowing him to argue by
telephone from Louisiana. The court then denied the motion, stating
"that for the reasons set forth on the [rlecord at [olral [alrgument,
defendant pro se's motion to quash service of the summons and to
dismiss the complaint is denied."63
On appeal, the Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Amelia
Kearse, noted that the issues of personal jurisdiction must be resolved
prior to reaching either the merits of the case, or plaintiffs' cross-appeal
from the denial of attorneys' fees. She explained that since the
Copyright Act did not provide for nationwide service of process, the
federal court must apply the forum state's-New
York-personal
jurisdiction rules. Judge Kearse reviewed decisions under New York's
long-arm statute and stated, "In order to determine whether a party has
'transacted business' in New York, a court must look to the totality of
circumstances concerning the party's connections to the state."64
Judge Kearse then explained:
In the present case, plaintiffs urged upon the district court various bases for
the assumption of personal jurisdiction over Baptiste. The court plainly
rejected Baptiste's jurisdictional challenge, but the record does not reveal the
ground of that rejection. Because the absence of an explanation prevents
meaningful appellate review, we remand the matter to the district court for
supplementation of the record with a statement of the factual and doctrinal

62. 203 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2000), vacated by 139 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
63. Id. at 195-96.
64. Id. at 1%.
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grounds for the court's ruling on personal jurisdiction.

65

D. The King Case
In King v. Washington Adventist ~ o s ~ i t athe
l , Second
~~
Circuit
issued an unpublished opinion affirming the dismissal of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York by Judge
Carol Bagley Amon.
In March of 1999, plaintiff King filed a Section 1983 action on
behalf of himself, his wife, and his daughter. The complaint related to
events that took place at the Montgomery Mall in Bethesda, Maryland.
The circuit court pointed out that a review of the district court's
dismissal was de novo. The court noted that because Section 1983 did
not establish a grant of nationwide jurisdiction, federal courts hearing
such claims must apply the rules of personal jurisdiction that govern the
state in which the court sits. The circuit court found absolutely no
grounds upon which the plaintiff had presented any facts sufficient to
sustain an exercise of personal jurisdiction under the law of New York
State. Thus, the district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was affirmed.

A. General Jurisdiction: C.P.L.R. 301
Federal district courts in the Second Circuit issued at least eleven
opinions which analyzed and applied New York's general jurisdiction
statute, C.P.L.R. 301.~' Three themes emerge from these cases. First, if
65. Id. at 197.
66. No. 00-7320,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 981, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 23,2001).
67. See infra notes 72-97 and accompanying text. See also Armstrong v. Virgin
Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that general
jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 301 existed over defendants subject to their right to renew
jurisdictional objections after completion of discovery); Shaheen Sports, Inc. v. Asia
Ins. Co., Ltd., 89 F. Supp. 2d 500,503 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs made
a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. 301); United
Mizrahi Bank, Ltd. v. Sullivan, No. 97-Civ-9282, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16157, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000) (stating that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to find
that defendants were "doing business" under C.P.L.R. 301); Clay Paky, S.p.A. v. VariLite, Inc., Nos. 99-Civ-11401, 99-Civ-11402, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9802, at *19-20
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2000) (finding that the defendant was subject to general jurisdiction
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a non-domiciliary corporate defendant is not licensed to do business in
New York, but maintains an office with employees who solicit business
in the state, use bank accounts, and have other property in the state,
general jurisdiction exists.68 Second, some courts focus less on the
traditional quantity of doing business contacts, but, rather, focus more
on the quality and value of those contachb9 Third, cases in which a
corporate defendant acts through a third party have caused some
diffi~ulties.~'When the entity not only serves the defendant's interests,
but performs activities which are essential to the defendant's operations,
the defendant may be deemed to be doing business in New York, but
only if an inference of agency exists. In this respect, jurisdictional
discovery will be granted if the plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case
of personal juri~diction.~'
1. Theme Z

One example of the first theme is GMAC Commercial Credit,
L. L. C. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,72 where the district court, by
Judge Constance Baker Motley, held that personal jurisdiction existed
under the "doing business" provision of C.P.L.R. 301. Judge Motley
stressed that the non-domiciliary corporate defendant admitted that it
maintained an office and place of business in New York. She also noted
the defendant was involved in an action against it in a New York State
court and that the defendant derived income from its activities in New
York. Judge Motley explained that the defendant's New York contacts
were continuous and systematic so that it was fair to presume a
corporate presence.73 Another example of the first theme is Gamarra v.
in New York under the "doing business" provision of C.P.L.R. 301); Ugalde v.
DynaCorp, Inc., No. 98-Civ-5459, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1745, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
23, 2000) (stating that defendants were subject to general jurisdiction in New York
under the "doing business" provision of C.P.L.R. 301).
68. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
71. Id.
72. 198 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
73. Id. at 406. Judge Motley stated:
Defendant, in its verified answer to the complaint in the state action, admits to
maintaining an office and place of business at that address in New York. Based
upon this admission, this court finds that defendant is "doing business" in New
York for the purposes of satisfying C.P.L.R. 301 and that defendant's contacts with
New York are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Id.
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Alamo Rent-A-Car, ~ n c . where
, ~ ~ the district court, by Judge John
Elfvin, held that there was no personal jurisdiction under the "doing
~
Elfvin stated:
business" provision of C.P.L.R. 3 0 1 . ~Judge
Given that defendants Horan or Cooze are not domiciliaries of New York and
otherwise have no physical presence in the United States, do not own any
property in New York[,] and have not engaged in any activities in New York
which might qualify them as doing business within the meaning of C.P.L.R.
301, there is no basis on which this c ourt may, under such section, exercise
personal jurisdiction over defendants.

$2

2. Theme 11
One example of the second theme is Photoactive Productions, Inc.
v. AL-OR International, ~ t d . where
, ~ ~ the district court, by Judge Arthur
Spatt, held that a manufacturer was engaged in a continuous and
systematic course of doing business in New York so as to warrant a
finding of its presence in New York for purposes of general jurisdiction
under C.P.L.R. 301. The defendant argued that it had "no offices,
warehouses, employees[,] or residences within New ~ o r k . " ~Also,
*
the
defendant claimed it did not maintain any officers, agents, or business
representatives in New York; did not own any real or personal property
in New York; and did not maintain any telephone numbers or directory
listings in New York. Its primary contacts with the Empire State were
solicitations by way of telephone contact from La Jolla, ~ a l i f o r n i a . ~ ~
Finally, the defendant argued that sales of its products to retailers within

74. No. 99-Civ-411,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at *I (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,2001).
75. Id. at *2. Plaintiff commenced his action in the New York State Supreme
Court, Erie County, seeking redress for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile
accident that occurred in the Province of Ontario, Canada. The action was removed on
diversity of citizenship grounds to the federal district court. Id.
76. Id. at *5. The district court also rejected personal jurisdiction on C.P.L.R. 302
grounds because any alleged tortious conduct and its resulting injury occurred in
Canada. Gamarra, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at *5.
77. 99 F. Supp. 2d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
78. Id. at 285.
79. Id. The defendant also argued, "New York is an inconvenient forum because
all the evidence, documents, witnesses[,] and principals are located in California." Id.
In addition, defendant claimed that none of its employees or representatives had ever
traveled to New York to negotiate, discuss, or enter into a contract with the plaintiff.
Hence, the defendant argued it did "not have sufficient minimum contacts with New
York to justify a finding of [personal] jurisdiction in the Eastern District of New York."
Photoactive Prods., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
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New York represented only three to five percent of its total sales.
Judge Spatt recognized that the defendant's solicitation of business
alone could not justify a finding of presence in New York pursuant to
C.P.L.R. 301. Nonetheless, relying on A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra
~ a n k , ~he' explained that, in the context of a motion to dismiss, he must
view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. He then stated:
[Tlhe [clourt notes that the plaintiff has made a [prim facie] showing of
jurisdiction by alleging that AL-OR solicits business in New York; advertises
in New York; conducts a large number of sales in New York; and receives
81
considerable revenue from sales in New York.

Judge Spatt focused on the fact that the defendant's advertising
schedule contemplated expenditures of more than $650,000 in New
York for 1999. This jurisdictional analysis is practical and pragmatic.
It avoids reliance on the traditional factors for a finding of general
jurisdiction, and it focuses on the benefits the non-domiciliary defendant
receives from New York. If the benefits are substantial, it is fair and
reasonable for the defendant to expect to be hailed into New York to
defend the lawsuit.

3. Theme III
Several cases illustrate the third theme. In Damn v. Marriott
International Hotels, 1nc.,8' the plaintiff octogenarian sought to recover
five million dollars in damages for personal injuries she suffered upon
exiting an unleveled elevator located in the Budapest Marriott Hotel.
The complaint gave rise to a "spate of defensive motions," one of
which, by Otis Felvono ("OF"), was to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
by Judge Charles Haight, stated, "The [clourt will first consider the
threshold question of whether this [clourt has personal jurisdiction over
OF."^^ Judge Haight explained that the plaintiff had not alleged that OF
directly conducted business in New York within the meaning of
C.P.L.R. 301; however, under New York law, jurisdiction could be
obtained over a foreign company if it is a "mere department" of an
80.
81.
82.
2001).
83.

989 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1993).
Photoactive Prods., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
No. 99-Civ-10496, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 642, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
Id. at *8.
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entity that is present in New ~ o r k Since
. ~ the plaintiff had alleged the
inference of an agency,85Judge Haight reviewed the Second Circuit's
requirements.
In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft, . . . the [clourt
announced the factors to consider in determining whether to assert jurisdiction
over a related foreign corporation. The "essential factor," which by itself is
not determinative is common ownership. . . . Here it is uncontested that OF is
wholly owned by OE. . . . Three other factors to consider are the financial
dependency of the subsidiary on the parent, the degree to which the parent
interferes in personnel and fails to observe corporate formalities, and the
degree of control over marketing and operations by the parent over the
86
subsidiary. . . .

In response to OF's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff submitted
pages from www.otis.com, a web-site of OF's parent corporation, which
was doing business in New York. The web-site advertised that the
parent had employees in 1700 worldwide locations, that eighty percent
of its employees were non-Americans, and that eighty percent of its
revenues were generated abroad. Judge Haight held that the facts
recited on the parent's corporate web-site raised legitimate questions as
to the level of control exercised by the parent with respect to OF, and,
further, that the questions raised by the Beech factors should be
addressed after discovery had occurred. Accordingly, the district court
allowed the plaintiff limited discovery to ascertain the jurisdictional
facts necessary to establish whether the court had general personal
jurisdiction over OF, pursuant to C.P.L.R. 301.~'
It is questionable whether Dorfman had shown a prima facie case
of personal jurisdiction, which the Second Circuit requires prior to
granting jurisdictional discovery.
In Aerotel, Ltd. v. Sprint corp.,8* the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, by Judge Shira Scheindlin, held
that if evidence existed that a nonresident defendant corporation and its
84. Id.
85. Id.at*lO-11.
86. Dorfman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 642, at * l l (citations omitted). Judge Haight
stated, "Where a plaintiff must, as here, establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence, the court is wise to allow this discovery." Id. at *14 (citing Filus v. Lot
Polish Airlines, 907 F.2d 1328, 1332 (2d Cir. 1990)).
87. Id. See also Sideman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 713
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that "where pertinent facts bearing on the question of
jurisdiction are in dispute, discovery should be allowed.").
88. 100 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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resident subsidiaries shared overlapping management, though
insufficient to pierce the corporate veil and establish the court's
personal jurisdiction over the parent, it was sufficient to avoid pretrial
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Scheindlin stated:
Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may
defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, . . . legally sufficient allegations
of jurisdiction. At that preliminary stage, the plaintiffs prima facie showing
may be established solely by allegations. After discovery, the plaintiffs
prima facie showing necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must
include an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to
establish jurisdiction over the defendant. At that point the prima facie
89
showing must be factually supported.

Two district court opinions illustrate how difficult the Beech fourpart test is to apply. In Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A,
~ o n s o l i d a t e dthe
~ ~United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, by Judge Michael Mukasey, dismissed a class action suit
against twenty European insurance companies for lack of personal
jurisdiction, and denied plaintiffs motion for jurisdictional discovery.9'
First, Judge Mukasey referred to the four factors in Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschafr v. Beech ~ircraft?' and explained that it was the
parent corporation who was doing business in New York, which the
plaintiff sought to impute to the subsidiary. Judge Mukasey found a
parentlsubsidiary relationship was not enough for an assertion of general
jurisdiction. Absent an agency relationship, which Judge Mukasey held
did not exist, there was no general jurisdiction. Judge Mukasey also
denied plaintiffs' requests for jurisdictional discovery. He relied on
89. Id. at 194.
90. Nos. 97-Civ-2262, 98-Civ-9186, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11991, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,2000).
91. Id. at *4-5. Judge Mukasey explained that the plaintiffs' complaint stated,
without any supporting facts, that the defendants participated in a multinational
insurance arrangement within the state of New York. He reasoned that these legal
conclusions presented as factual allegations were not facts and could not substitute for
facts. Judge Mukasey noted that conclusory non-fact-specific jurisdictional allegations
were not sufficient to establish even a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction
under C.P.L.R. 301. Id.
92. 751 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1984). Beech set out four factors: (1) common
ownership, which is essential; (2) financial dependency of the subsidiary on the parent
corporation; (3) the degree to which the parent corporation interferes in the selection and
assignment of the subsidiary's executive personnel and fails to observe corporate
formalities; and (4) the degree of control over the marketing and operational policies of
the subsidiary exercised by the parent. Id. at 120-22.
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Jazini v. Nissan Motor c o . y 3 for the rule that if the plaintiffs did not
establish a prima facie case showing that the district court had
jurisdiction over the defendant, the court would not err in denying
discovery on that issue.94
In Jerge v. pottery5 the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York rejected plaintiff's argument that a
subsidiary doing business in New York could be imputed to its parent
corporation. The court analyzed the four factors derived from Beech,
concluding that the Second Circuit's requirement that accounting
principles require parent corporations to consolidate financial statements
if the parent corporation owns more than fifty percent of a subsidiary's
stock meant the consolidation was non-dispositive of the jurisdictional
issue.96 The court also pointed out that having common directors and
officers is a normal business practice of a multinational corporation, and
absent complete control, there is no justification to labeling a subsidiary
a mere department of the parent corp~ration.~'

B. Long-arm Jurisdiction: C.P.L.R. 302

I . Initial Observations
Federal district courts in the Second Circuit issued approximately
fifty opinions analyzing and applying New York's long-arm statuteC.P.L.R. 3 0 2 . ~In
~ about one-half of the opinions, federal district court
93. 148 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 186.
95. No. 99-CV-03 12E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 1648, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,
2000).
96. Id. at *3.
97. Id. at *4.
98. See In re Surnitomo Copper Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(stating that under New York's long-arm statute, the court had specific personal
jurisdiction over officers and directors of broker in RICO action); Mario Valente
Collezioni, Ltd. v. Confezioni Semeraro Paolo, 115 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding that long-arm jurisdiction exists under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l)'s "contracts
anywhere" clause); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, No. 99-Civ-11480, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11516, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000) (finding that long-arm jurisdiction in
intellectual property cases exists under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l)); Credit Suisse First Boston
Corp. v. Continental Sav. Bank, No. 99-(3-2792, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 793, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000) (holding that a commercial tort did not occur within New York
for purposes of C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) jurisdiction); Weissman v. Seiyu, Ltd., No. 98-Civ6976,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 509, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18,2000) (holding that long-arm
jurisdiction exists because of the activities of defendant's agents in New York State).

Heinonline - - 21 QLR 33 2001-2003

judges found personal jurisdi~tion.~~
In the other half of the opinions,
they found no personal jurisdiction.loO A review of these survey year
cases indicates that the district courts have focused almost exclusively
on C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l)'s "transaction of business" contract and tort
cases, and on C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) tort matters.''' A review of the
cases reveals several interesting trends.
First, in diversity cases and in matters where there is no nationwide
jurisdiction, a federal district court must determine if personal
jurisdiction exists based on the law of the forum state. Every survey
case referred to in this Article is from a New York Federal District
Court. The majority of these opinions rely almost exclusively on other
federal opinions interpreting New York State substantive law. There is
little direct reference to recent personal jurisdiction decisions by New
York State appellate courts. New York's long-arm statute is restricted
and does not go as far as is constitutionally permissible. In addition to
being constrained by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is also restricted by Article I, Section six, of the New
York State Constitution. Federal district court judges who fail to rely on

See also Plunket v. Doyle, No. 99-Civ-11006, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2001, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (finding that a dispute over works of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle,
author of the Sherlock Holmes stories, did not fit within C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii),
therefore, jurisdictional discovery denied, but the plaintiff was given an opportunity to
replead, and if sufficient facts were plead, then limited jurisdictional discovery would be
permitted); Arista Tech, Inc. v. Little Enters., 125 F. Supp. 2d 641,651 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(stating that there was no long-arm jurisdiction because of plaintiffs failure to allege
tortious acts outside New York, as required by C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii)); Domond v. Great
Am. Recreation, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that a New
Jersey amusement park owner was not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in a personal
injury action because C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) and 302(a)(3)(ii) requirements not satisfied);
Maldonado v. Rogers, 99 F. Supp. 2d 235,238 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no jurisdiction
under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) when accident occurred outside New York; although
plaintiff suffered consequences of injuries in New York); Best Cellars, Inc. v. Grape
Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431,444 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that in a federal
question case, personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants was determined by
looking to law of jurisdiction in which federal court sits; long-arm jurisdiction existed
under subsection (a)(l), but not under (a)(3) of C.P.L.R.); Banicade Books, Inc. v.
Langberg, No. 95-Civ-8906, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18279, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2000) (finding no long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) or (a)(2); however,
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) requirements satisfied); Cornell v. Assicurazioni General, S.p.A.,
Consol., No. 97-Civ-2262,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11004, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7,2000)
(finding that the plaintiff failed to show long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l),
and did not allege facts sufficient to warrant limited jurisdictional discovery).
99. See cases cited supra note 98.
100. See cases cited supra note 98.
101. See cases cited supra note 98.
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recent state appellate decisions may not be complying with the spirit of
the Second Circuit's ruling in Arrowsmith v. United Press
~nternational,'~~
and its progeny.lo3
Second, if a personal jurisdiction objection is made by a defendant,
it is clear that the plaintiff need only initially make a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction. Although the district court can decide the
motion on affidavits alone, some courts permit jurisdictional discovery.
In a majority of the personal jurisdiction district court cases, decisions
were made without the benefit of discovery. This is unfair, particularly
when the plaintiff has requested jurisdictional discovery. Also, district
court judges do not request sua sponte that parties engage in
jurisdictional discovery. Jurisdictional discovery enables the plaintiff to
gather information to assist him in meeting his ultimate burden-to
establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial
hearing or at trial. The standards used for determining if plaintiffs have
made out a prima facie case for purposes of obtaining discovery vary in
the circuit. Some district court judges are more willing to permit
jurisdictional discovery than others. This lack of uniformity is unfair. It
leads to increased appellate burdens on the Second Circuit. Also, it is
well-known that a favorable jurisdictional decision for a plaintiff is
tantamount to a favorable settlement. What settles before one district
court judge may be appealed, dropped, or settled for less before another
district court judge.
Third, there are at least fifteen district court decisions where longarm jurisdiction is based on phone calls, faxes, and web-sites.Io4 These
decisions indicate an increase in the judicial business of Second Circuit

102. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
103. See cases cited supra note 12.
104. See infra notes 106-126 and accompanying text. See also Telebyte, Inc. v.
Kendaco, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating web-site not
sufficient for personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l), (a)(2), or (a)(3)); On Line
Mktg., Inc. v. Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc., No. 99-Civ-10411, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95036, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2000) (finding telephone and fax contacts with
New York insufficient for long-arm jurisdiction); Nader v. Getshaw, No. 99-Civ-11556,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14308, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) (finding no C.P.L.R.
302(a)(l) or (a)(3) long-arm jurisdiction because telephone and mail contacts of
defendant were not sufficient for purposes of statute); Stewart v. Vista Point Verlag &
Ringier Publ'g Co., No. 99-Civ-4225, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14236, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2000) (stating that a web-site is not sufficient for purposes of long-arm
jurisdiction, therefore, jurisdictional discovery denied); Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., No.
00-CV-243, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9533, at *I (S.D.N.Y. July 1 I, 2000) (stating website not sufficient for long-arm jurisdiction).
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courts. Few of these cases are filed in New York State courts.'05
Finally, two district court cases involve the application of sanctions and
the law of res judicata.
2. Cases Highlighted
In Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl ~ o r n ~ a n i e sthe
,'~~
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, by
Judge Denny Chin, held that the court had personal jurisdiction over an
internet registrant. The defendant was a California domiciliary who had
diluted a trademark by registering the mark as an internet domain name
and telephoning the holder in New York with an offer to sell the domain
name rights. Judge Chin found personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R.
302(a)(3)(ii). Judge Chin pointed out that the plaintiff had alleged that
the defendant committed a tortious act outside the state
("cybersquatting") that caused injury to the plaintiff within the state. In
addition, the defendant expected or reasonably should have expected his
actions to have consequences in New York, and he derived substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce. "He had a web-site
offering domain names for sale and he in fact sold two domain
names."lo7 Judge Chin also concluded that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant would not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. He stated, "Storey [the defendant]
purposefully availed himself of the benefits of doing business in New
York. He telephoned Cello [the plaintiffl twice and sent an e-mail to
Cornell, and thus he 'reached out' and 'originated' contacts with New
york."lo8
In Mason Tayler Medical Products Corp. v Qwikstrip Products,
105. This Survey author has lectured annually since 1989 on personal jurisdiction
before the New York State Trial Lawyers Institute and notes that most of the recent fax,
phone, and web-site jurisdiction reported cases are in federal court. For an instructive
and scholarly review of the issues, see Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96-Civ-3620,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (discussing long-arm
jurisdiction based on nonresident's internet contacts with New York).
106. 89 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
107. Id. at 470.
108. Id. At all pertinent times, for purposes of considering whether personal
jurisdiction existed, Storey was a citizen and resident of California. He never resided in,
or had been a citizen of, New York. He never owned any real property, or maintained
any offices, bank accounts, or telephone listings in New York. He had not personally
visited New York in almost thirty years. After registering his domain name, however,
Storey sent electronic mail messages to at least nine individuals or companies he had
targeted to sell items. Id.
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L.L.c.,"~ the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York, by Judge John Elfvin, found that the defendant transacted
business in New York under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) by making telephone,
fax, and internet contacts to the Empire State. He reminded the bar that
the New York long-arm statute is a single contact statute and that so
long as the relevant cause of action arises from the contact there is
jurisdiction. Judge Elfvin also reminded the bar, "It is well settled that a
defendant need not be physically present in New York to be found to
have transacted business here.,9110 Similarly, in Toledo Peoria &
Western Railway Corp. v. Southern Illinois Railcar Co.,11 1 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York, by Judge
Kahn, held that a defendant's renewal of lease terms via telephone and
facsimile communications constituted sufficient contact with New York
to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction of the court. Judge
Kahn stated, "[Ilt is also clear that the physical presence, in this cellular
and digital age, is not necessary.
The substance of those
communications dominates, not their quantity or form."112
Judge Kahn qualified his opinion by noting that, despite modern
advances in technology, jurisdiction "conveys a sense of limits and
boundaries of the appropriate balance between states and the federal
government dictated by federalism.3,113 This is a position which the
United States Supreme Court, arguably, repudiated long ago.l14
In Haddad Brothers, Inc. v. Little Things Mean A Lot, Inc.,115 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, by
Judge Alan Schwartz, held that personal jurisdiction existed over a Utah
corporation engaged in the business of producing, marketing, and
selling various lines of christening clothing for babies. Judge Schwartz
found general jurisdiction but stated, "Even if the 'doing business' test
were not applicable here, the court would still have jurisdiction over
109. No. 99-CV-0177E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5170, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
2000).
1 10. Id. at *4.
1 1 1. 84 F. Supp. 2d 340 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
112. Id.at343.
113. Id.
114. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 n.10 (1982). The Due Process Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns. "Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent
restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the
personal jurisdiction requirement." Id.
115. No. 00-Civ-0578, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11035, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4,
2000).
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Little Things under New York's long-arm statute."'I6 Key to this
conclusion was the fact that the defendant's online store also offered
products to New York ~ustorners.''~Similarly, in Cable News Network,
L.P. v. Gosms.Com, Inc.,"* the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, by Lawrence McKenna, held that the
defendant was subject to long-arm jurisdiction under C.P.L.R.
302(a)(3)(ii). With respect to the expectation requirement of the longarm statute, Judge McKenna stressed that the defendant had used mobile
telephone service for its worldwide market. This was sufficient under
the Second Circuit's Kerman v. Kurz-Hustings, Inc.'19 rule, to satisfy the
statutory requirements.
An instructive web-site case is Hsin Ten Enterprise, USA, Inc. v.
Clark ~ n t e r ~ r i s e swhere
, ' ~ ~ the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, by Judge Shira Scheindlin, thoughtfully
analyzed the question of when web-site contacts are sufficient for
jurisdiction purposes.'2' The judge pointed out that the Second Circuit
has made it clear that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is not
appropriate simply because the defendant maintains a web-site, which
residents of New York may visit. Rather, Judge Scheindlin stated,
"[C]ourts must examine the nature and quality of commercial activity
that an entity conducts over the internet."'22
Judge Scheindlin reminded the bar that courts considering the issue
of the amount of internet activity sufficient to trigger personal
jurisdiction must examine a number of facts.'23 First, at the lower end
of the spectrum are passive web-sites, which primarily make
information available to viewers but do not permit an exchange of
i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ' ~Such
~
web-sites do not confer personal jurisdiction.
Judge Scheindlin expanded:
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which the defendant clearly does
business over the internet, such as where it repeatedly transmits computer files

116. Id. at *5.
1 1 7. Id. at *4.
118. No. 00-Civ-4812, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16156, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30,
2000).
119. 175 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1999).
120. No. 00-Civ-5878, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18717, at * I (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
2000).
121. Id. at *11-15.
122. Id. at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id.
124. Clark Enters., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187 17, at "14.
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to customers in other states. . . . Occupying the middle ground are
'interactive' web-sites, which permit the exchange of information between the
defendant and web-site viewers. . . . Generally, an interactive web-site
supports a finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.125

Judge Scheindlin found C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) "transaction of
business" specific jurisdiction because "Clark's [wleb-sites enabled the
viewer to purchase the [elxercise [mlachine online, download an order
form, download an application to become an 'independent affiliate,' and
ask questions of an online representative. At the very least, the [wlebsites are highly interactive.,3126 The court concluded that the "arising out
of' requirement was satisfied, and that there were minimum contacts for
purposes of satisfying the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

3. Final Cases
a. Rule 11

In Roberts-Gordon, L.L.C. v. Superior Radiant Products, ~ t d . , ' ~ ~
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York,
by Judge Richard Acara, held that sanctions could not be imposed on an
Ontario manufacturer for challenging jurisdiction.
The plaintiff moved for sanctions against the defendant, arguing
that its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was
predicated on false and misleading statements contained in an affidavit
that it submitted. The plaintiff argued that the affidavit falsely stated
that the defendant had no end-user customers in New York State, that
defendant's New York distributors were not authorized to contract on
behalf of the company, and generally denied that the defendant had
sufficient contacts with New York to entertain j~risdicti0n.l~~
Judge Acara, who adopted a report from Magistrate Judge Leslie
Foschio, reminded the bar that Rule 11 sanctions are to be imposed
when it appears that a competent attorney could not form the requisite
reasonable belief as to the validity of what is asserted in a pleading or
motion. He also stated, "A violation of Rule 11 requiring the imposition
of sanctions occurs where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at *14-15.
Id.
85 F. Supp. 2d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 219.
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no chance of success. . . . A subjective claim of good faith does not
provide a 'safe harbor' from the threat of this rule."'29 Judge Acara then
found that sanctions were not warranted because the record supported a
finding that the motion was not frivolous when made as the complaint
alluded to jurisdiction based on the presence of the defendant's
interactive web-site and distributors in New york.l3'

b. Res Judicata
The final survey year case is 1 Five 0,Inc. v. A. ~chulman,'~'
where the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York, by Judge John Elfvin, held that a state court ruling regarding
personal jurisdiction was binding on the defendant. The plaintiff had
filed a state court action and later moved to strike the defendant's
jurisdictional defenses. The Supreme Court of New York denied the
plaintiff's motion to strike and specifically held that the plaintiff had
failed to establish that the defendant had minimum contacts with New
York under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l). The parties later entered into a
stipulation to discontinue that suit without prejudice to
recommencement in a court of proper jurisdiction. On the same day,
plaintiff commenced his federal 1 a ~ s u i t . l ~ ~
The defendant moved to dismiss the federal claims on the grounds
of issue preclusion~ollatera1estoppel-arguing
that the issue of
personal jurisdiction was adequately litigated and adjudicated in the
prior state proceeding. The plaintiff argued that because the state court
ruling was not dispositive of the state action on jurisdictional grounds, it
was not binding on the district court. The plaintiff had not been given
an opportunity to litigate whether jurisdiction existed under C.P.L.R.
302(a)(2) or (a)(3).133
Judge Elfvin noted that federal courts must give to a prior state
court decision the same preclusive effect, either claim preclusion or
issue preclusion, that the courts of New York would give to it. He then
reviewed the narrow doctrine of issue preclusion as applied in state
courts, and concluded that it should be applied. Judge Elfvin
disregarded plaintiffs argument that the state court had not considered
--

129.
130.
131.
2000).
132.
133.

-

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
No. 99-Civ-0354E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7938, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 31,
Id.
Id. at *2.
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whether jurisdiction existed under C.P.L.R. 302 (a)(2) or (a)(3).'34 The
result confuses claim preclusion with issue preclusion. The fact that the
state court judge made a jurisdictional determination solely based on
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(l) should not preclude the plaintiff from relitigating the
issue of personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) or (a)(3).

This year's Survey on personal jurisdiction cases demonstrates that
the judges of the Second Circuit devote an enormous amount of their
valuable time to questions of whether they have power over nondomiciliary defendants. One can only speculate as to how many of the
district court opinions discussed in the Survey will be appealed to the
Second Circuit. The nation's federal appellate courts' dockets are
crowded. Federal district court judges should require at least limited
jurisdictional discovery prior to granting or denying personal
jurisdiction defenses. Discovery is required because the plaintiff must
ultimately establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and
because facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are usually in
dispute.

134.

Id.
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